

UNCLASSIFIED

**Washington Army National Guard
Strategic Plan
FY2025 - FY2035**



UNCLASSIFIED

Table of Contents

Introduction 3

The Strategic Environment.....4

Commanding General’s Intent8

The Strategic Approach..... 9

Strategic Lines of Effort.....11

Glossary19

References 22

1. Introduction.

The Washington Army National Guard (WAARNG) Strategic Plan is a concept for how the WAARNG will achieve its organizational change goals over the next 10 years. This document provides a point of aim for the organization. It outlines the desired strategic “ends” of the organization in support of our Mission and general “ways” to pursue them. The strategic plan is informed by the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, “The 23rd DARNGs [Director of the Army National Guard] ‘Quick-Hitter,’” The Army Strategy, and the Washington Military Department (WMD) Strategy. However, this strategy is principally the product of the 2024 Strategic Planning Conference conducted on 23-24 October, and follow-up meetings of the Ways and Means Working Group. This Strategic Plan generally refers to the Business and Organizational Strategy of the WAARNG, and as such, takes many elements from civilian strategic organizational change endeavors.

The Mission of the WAARNG is:

The WAARNG delivers Combat-Ready forces ISO Federal Missions. On Order provides prepared teams to Civil Authorities to protect the lives, rights, and property of our communities.

The WAARNG Vision – our future **End State** – is as follows:

By 2035, the WAARNG is a learning organization that champions creativity and continuous adaptation in conditions of uncertainty and constraint. We are ready to fight and win our nation’s wars and protect the citizens of Washington. Our readiness and confidence in our Soldiers, equipment, and mission allows us to deploy, fight, and prevail in the current and emerging operational environments. Our combination of capabilities and 8,100 Soldiers postures us to meet the evolving needs of our state and nation, and international partners, while providing opportunities to expand our relevance in a changing operational environment. The WAARNG is a premier place to serve, trusted by Soldiers, the community, and the Army. Our reputation, readiness, and relevance set the conditions for sustained excellence.

The WAARNG of 2035 is committed to our **Organizational Values**:

Soldier First is what you do. We are **Soldiers First**, and must be competent in our individual Soldier requirements and skills. As our touchstone, this requires the belief in individual readiness and the connection of each Soldier to the powerful tradition of service in the U.S. Army and our National Guard. **Soldier First** requires a steadfast commitment to Army Values, standards, and toughness.

Soldier Centric is what the organization does. Everything we do as Command Teams, Staffs, or Leaders must be framed by the critical question, “What does this mean to the Soldier and his or her Family?” Everything from planning to execution is through the lens of the Soldier. When we get this right, we will build trust.

The Soldier First & Soldier Centric Dichotomy The WAARNG balances these two values by recognizing that they merge together into a contract between the individual Soldier and senior leaders/command teams of the WAARNG. The Soldier commits to be individually ready and proficient in their duties. Senior leaders and command teams commit to their Soldiers that they will respect their time, and consider the best interests of Soldiers both individually and collectively when making decisions.

Brilliance in the Basics is our approach to training. We train tough, ethical, and professionally competent Soldiers. We identify and prioritize the basic tasks we choose to execute and then master them. Officers produce orders, NCO's prepare, rehearse and execute.

Leader Development. We train **Leadership** at echelon. We develop leaders by trusting and empowering them to execute consequential missions. We instill authority, ownership, and decision making back at all echelons down to the lowest level possible. Diversity in leadership strengthens our Guard. Developing leaders includes ensuring the value of fair competition for key assignments, opportunities, and promotions.

Disciplined Initiative within Intent. We enable this by communicating precisely **through** echelon and by building **mutual trust & shared understanding** of Commander's Intent. This forms the foundation of **Mission Command**, which enables us to accomplish all missions and capitalize on emerging opportunities.

Build Winning Units. Our units are built with Guardsmen who are **Soldiers First**, and their units have such a powerful Army identity that Soldiers are **proud to serve** here. Winning units are technically, tactically, and operationally proficient while remaining ready to execute our **mission**. Winning is measured with science by performance in key metrics and assessed in art by the command.

2. **The Strategic Environment**.

“All organizations start with WHY, but only the great ones keep their WHY clear year after year.”

– Simon Sinek, Author of Start with Why.

a. Why a Strategic Plan.

We want to win, and winning requires a deliberate plan.

Strategy is primarily concerned with connecting **ends** to **ways** and **means**. This strategic document lays out ends and ways, while the Army Campaign Plan outlines our prioritized ways and means. Together, they constitute the overall strategy for the Washington Army National Guard.

Ends are objectives or desired outcomes for a given strategy. The terms “end state” and “goals” are synonymous with **ends**. **Ways** are the actions, methods, or processes executed to achieve the **ends**. **Means** are the resources required to execute **ways**. **Means** include manpower, time, and financial resources. As **means** are inherently finite,

prioritization of these resources toward **ends** is required.

The Strategic Plan is a living document and is meant to outline the **ends** and **ways** of the WAARNG strategy. It is reviewed annually or when conditions warrant revision. Strategy is assessed through quantifiable metrics to determine effectiveness and shape future revisions. This assessment takes place through monthly and yearly review of metrics by the core strategy team.

The out-product of these assessments is revision to this Strategic Plan and generation of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), which prioritizes **ends** and highlights **ways** for a 3-5 year window. The execution of this strategy is then operationalized and connected to specific **means** via the yearly Base Operations Order (BOO).

The proponent for the Strategic Plan is the G5. The proponent for the Army Campaign Plan is the G5 supported by the G3 (G35). The proponent for the Base Operations Order and the Commander’s Training Guidance is the G3 (G35/G33). The CG approves the overall WAARNG strategy. A recommended timeline for these products is included in section four. How all these products fit together sequenced to time is highlighted in Figure 1 (below).




Figure 1 – The “Assembly Line” of WAARNG Strategic Planning products

Strategic planning is one corner of the Army’s Integrated Management System (IMS) alongside Organizational Assessment (OA), Continuous Process Improvement (CPI),

and Performance Management (PM). In this context, strategic planning refers to achieving organizational change through business transformation.

b. Past Operational Environment (POE) and Results of Prior (2020-2030) Strategic Plan.

“By traveling into the past, I enhance my grasp of the present.”

— General Jim Mattis, Central Washington University Graduate and Tri-cities resident.
Author of Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead

During the period of the prior 2020-2030 strategic plan, the WAARNG was part of the Army wide refocus on great-power competition and preparation for great-power conflict. The potential for these was vividly demonstrated in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and China’s bullying of neighbors like the Philippines in the South China Sea. This refocus has continued the National Guard’s involvement in major exercises, while reinforcing the importance of the State Partnership Program as part of campaigning in competition. The National Guard found itself increasing domestic support for the myriad issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic and for civil disturbances related to social issues, COVID, and elections.

The vision for the prior strategic plan was:

The WAARNG’s reputation and readiness are trusted and valued by our Soldiers, our community, the Army and our elected officials allowing us to benefit from new opportunities. It is regionally aligned within Washington state to maximize mission command, with a force structure optimized for strategic opportunities. It capitalizes on our unique differences, becoming an organization of choice for our Soldiers and Civilians and is a key influencer of the strategic direction of the National Guard.

This vision was largely achieved, and this strategy builds on this.

- Regionally aligned: Many units were restationed to maximize mission command, including 2-146 FA, and 1-303 CAV.
- Force structure optimized for strategic opportunities: In particular, our information operations capabilities have remained in high demand for both real-world missions in CENTCOM, and training and exercises in INDOPACOM, from Korea to Thailand. Our combination of force structure and trust has provided us more opportunities than we can accept and paved the way for the potential participation in Pacific Pathways in FY2027 by elements from across the WAARNG. However, we have not achieved the end strength necessary to capitalize on emerging opportunities for new force structure.
- Organization of Choice: In a booming economy, where parttime Soldiers do not need the National Guard, we have maintained our strength and built a powerful recruiting apparatus, exceeding our recruiting mission in FY2024 and far ahead of plan by Q2FY2025. This is the product of years of deliberately working to become an organization of choice. Continued effort to increase end strength is required for potential opportunities with ARSTRUC changes, such as additional infantry formations.

- Key Influencer: The WAARNG is influential, but this success could be expanded. Numerous former WAARNG members serve in NGB, including three strategists, and we also count a deputy commanding general in 36ID. However, influence with NGB and 36ID only produces so much, and the relationships we have established and deliberately groomed with INDOPACOM, I Corps, 7ID, and others, combined with maintaining and growing influence with NGB, will unlock doors for this next iteration of strategy.

c. Current Operational Environment (COE).

The COE continues to be characterized by great-power competition and the specter of that competition turning into crisis and then conflict. The National Guard remains an operational reserve that is employed as part of campaigning and is programed into national contingency plans. What has changed is that for the first time in generations, the national homeland is a serious target for adversaries, and that presents additional challenges for the National Guard. Simultaneously, budgetary pressures grow yearly, despite nominal growth in the National Defense Authorization Act. As challenges grow and budgets remain flat or shrink, there is opportunity if we can demonstrate superior readiness, relevance, and reputation. We have the opportunity to shape our own future; failure to do so will leave us at the whims of National Guard Bureau and Forces Command.

However, opportunity needs to be carefully managed since mishandling could leave us unprepared for the future. Our Soldiers are our ultimate asset and being an operational reserve places considerable strain on the triad of Soldier welfare, family support, and employer commitment (Figure 2). Some units will require commitment beyond the statutory 48 Unit Training Assembly (UTA) periods and 15 days of Annual Training (AT) per year. This strain is felt more acutely by the traditional (MDAY) Soldiers in the WAARNG.




Figure 2 – Triad of Soldier Welfare (MDAY Soldiers)

The impacts of these requirements have been significant on the force. End strength has trended downward over 11 years resulting in a net loss of 850 assigned Soldiers and a 2024 year-end gap of 550 vacancies.

d. Future Operational Environment (FOE).

Over the next ten years, the WAARNG wants to complete the shift to a predominant focus on supporting the Indopacific area of responsibility, while growing end strength to 8,100. However, the FOE is not expected to be easier than the COE. Russia will likely recover from its disastrous initial performance in the Russia-Ukraine War. China continues its alarming military buildup that is supposed to make it capable of successfully invading Taiwan by 2027, with a military equal to or superior to the United States by 2049. Simultaneously, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea will likely continue at least partial coordination as part of the ‘axis of upheaval.’ This will increase the importance of exercises with foreign partners for diplomatic and interoperability issues.

Simultaneously, the National Guard may be called upon for domestic operations such as border security and infrastructure defense. Despite these increased foreign and domestic demands, we anticipate the budget to remain flat or on a slight downtrend over time, once inflation and pay raises are accounted for.

3. Commanding General’s Intent.

The WAARNG becomes deliberate in planning, processes, and actions to instill organizational values and meet Federal and domestic mission requirements, while enhancing internal and external reputation, providing stability for Soldiers, Families, and employers, maximizing strength, reducing threats, seizing beneficial opportunities, and building trust.

4. Strategic Approach.

The WAARNG’s central challenge is how to prioritize resources to remain ready while modernizing and preparing for a different future to achieve the **WAARNG end state** (See Figure 4). The WAARNG Strategy establishes four lines of effort (LOE) with specific objectives to affect organizational change by 2035 or earlier. These lines of effort are **People and Talent Management, Winning Units, Innovation and Transformation, and Reputation.**

The prioritization of LOEs and connection to resources (means) occurs in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and is operationalized in the yearly Base Operations Order (BOO). The WAARNG Strategy requires steadfast commitment from every Leader at all echelons.

a. Battle Rhythm/Process Flow.

Strategic planning is a process that is cyclical and deliberate. To this end, there are several time-sequenced events that require staff and leader input to shape changes to the plan. This process also provides a feedback to Joint Staff domestic operations planning to help shape future Army plans. The yearly battle rhythm for the WAARNG strategic plan staff actions is:




Figure 3 – The Strategic Planning Battle Rhythm

b. Planning Events. Staff planning events are outlined in the following table. Note that these dates are not rigid, but better outline an approach and rough timeline.

When	Event	What	Who	Input	Output
October of FY	Strat Plan Review / Assessment Phase	Detailed review of MOP/MOE of current (FY+9) strategic plan. Review of WAARNG FY+9 End State.	Lead: G5, Members: G5 Strat plan core team, G5 Data/Metrics team, CoS.	Key Performance Indicators from SMS	Information Brief; Strategic Plan Assessment
3-4th Week of October of FY	Strategic Planning Workshop	Information Brief of Assessment and Planning Guidance for Campaign Plan	Lead: G5, Members: Directorates, CG, G5 Core and Metrics Teams	Strategic Plan assessment comments, CoS input	Changes to Strategic Plan (if needed) and Army Campaign Planning Priorities
November of FY	Army Campaign Plan Development Phase	Assessment and development of the FY+4 Campaign Plan. Connection of Strategic Plan Ends to Ways and Means.	Lead: G5, Members: Directorates, G5 Core and Metrics Teams,	Strategic Planning Workshop out products	Revised Army Campaign Plan Information Brief
3rd Week of November of FY	ACP Information Brief	Brief of the assessment and planning considerations for FY+4 Campaign Plan	Lead: G5, For: CG, Attendees: Directorates, Strategic Planning Core Team, Data/Metrics Team, MSC leadership	Revised Army Campaign Plan Information Brief, Stakeholder Feedback	CG's Guidance to Army Campaign Plan
December of FY	Base Operations Order Development Phase	Translating priorities from Army Campaign Plan to Base Operations Order for FY+1	Lead: G3, Members: Directorates, CoS, MSC leadership	CG's Guidance to Army Campaign Plan	Information Brief on Base Operations Order for FY+1
1-2nd Week of January of FY	Base Operations Order Information Brief	Brief of the Assessment of the Campaign Plan Priorities and Connection to Base Operations Order	Lead: G3, For: CG, Members: Directorates, CoS	Army Campaign Plan Priorities, Strategic Planning metrics review	CG's Guidance to Base Operations Order for FY+1
Jan-Apr of FY	ATMC UTP process for FY+1	Army Training Management Conference to develop unit training plans IAW FM 7-0	Lead: G3, Members: Unit Commanders	Army Campaign Plan, Base Operations Order WARNO	Unit Training Plans

5. Strategic Lines of Effort.




Figure 4 – The WAARNG Lines of Effort (Current as of FY2025)

a. LOE 1: People and Talent Management.

“The Soldier is the Army. No army is better than its Soldiers.”

- General George Patton

Why people and talent management

matters: The Army’s source of power is its people, which includes both quantity and quality. End Strength (quantity) is strategic currency. Civilian organizations’ agility comes from their profitability, the Army’s agility comes from manned organizations that develop and retain talent.

Definition: People and talent management is the strategy and practices used to attract, develop, engage, and retain Soldiers with a comparative advantage to our neighboring states, sister services, and other competitors.

Quantity and quality are linked: opportunities for development create organizations that Soldiers want to remain in and that outsiders want to join. High end strength allows the WAARNG to take high payoff risks and reinvest in the organization, and will position us to gain relevant force structure, such as a Multi-Domain Task Force or Division HQ.

Definitions:

1.1 Recruiting. The number of new Soldiers assessed into the WAARNG in a given year.

1.2 Retention & Attrition Management. Retention is the percentage of Soldiers, who are eligible to ETS in a given year, who elect to extend. Attrition management is the process of reducing preventable, non-ETS or retirement losses.

1.3 Manage Talent. Development and utilization of personnel that builds a better force while providing agency to Soldiers.

1.4 Grow Competent Combat Capable Leaders. Understanding the requirements to win modern large-scale combat, and deliberately focusing on preparing leaders to prevail.

LOE1 End state. The WAARNG surpasses 8100 end strength by 01OCT2035 and is postured to maintain or grow this advantage. We have established systems, integral to our way of business, for Soldier development and career progression that develop leaders who will prevail in combat.

1.1 Recruit. Potential Ways: We will maintain our increased recruiting posture, employ novel recruiting methods, and continue to develop incentives for successful recruiting.

Objective Goal: Build to 8,100 end strength by 2035.

1.2 Retain. Potential Ways: We will actively seek to improve command climates, reduce administrative misfires (pay, benefits, etc.), and target Soldiers at risk for retention failure or preventable separation.

Objective Goal: Retain Soldiers above the national average.

1.3 Manage Talent. Potential Ways: Provide opportunities for talent growth through clear

career pipeline, sharing unit lifecycles, and promotion management, transfers, and professional military education.

Objective Goal: Soldiers are generally able to plan for at least the next three years and understand possible career arcs. Talent management drives retention.

1.4 Grow Competent Combat Capable Leaders. Potential Ways: Seeking participation in the Minuteman program for the force-on-force portion of NTC/JRTC rotations – either as formations, or leaders augmenting other units. LPD sessions focused on tactical problems, with an emphasis on winning on the emerging battlefield.

Objective Goal: Every MSC deliberately prioritizes understanding the modern operational environment and develops training plans to grow leaders who can prevail. Growing leaders is not left to PME but is forefront in unit culture.

b. LOE 2: Winning Units.

“Winning is not a sometime thing...it's an all the time thing. You don't win once in a while...you don't do the right thing once in a while...you do them right all the time. Winning is a habit.”

- Vince Lombardi, former Head Coach of Green Bay Packers

Definition: Winning units are technically, tactically, and cognitively proficient and ready to execute our mission. Their leaders and members are experts in their craft.

Why winning units matter: This is a competitive sport and we are in competition with other states, components, and services to be the organization of choice for our Soldiers, Stakeholders, State, and Nation. Winning feels good, and teams that win become addicted to winning. They seek victory when victory seems impossible.

Winning units know what to do and why they do it. They understand their basic technical skills, but also are students of the profession of arms. Winning units win on the home front, during training, and on the battlefield. Winning doesn't happen by chance; it is a deliberate process which marries the science of professional development, collective training, and healthy competition with the art of leadership (see figure 5).




Figure 5 - Leader Development (Adapted from Daniel Kahneman's *Thinking Fast and Slow*)

LOE 2 End state: WAARNG units win through superior leaders and Soldiers, who create units that Soldiers want to be part of. Our units correctly prioritize events that contribute to our vision while building our ability to excel as combined arms formations.

2.1 Develop Leaders and Soldiers. Potential Ways: Campaign plans, which account for leader and Soldier development, drive unit training plans (UTPs), and provide clear resourcing. Leadership development programs (LDPs) with clear goals and sound approaches. Prepare leaders to exercise mission command through echelon to win. Meaningful overseas duty training and other events that build our formations and provide aiming points.

Objective Goal: UTPs both deliberately incorporate development opportunities and support the philosophy of mission command. LDPs that are deliberate and prioritized, with continuity over leadership turnover. Targeted major training events that align with our development goals.

Definitions:
2.1 Develop Leaders and Soldiers. Deliberately improving our people, including their breadth/depth of experience, lethality, and institutional knowledge.

2.2 Sense of Belonging. Being a Soldier and member of a particular unit are sources of pride. Each unit has an identity that it actively builds.

2.2 Sense of Belonging. Potential Ways: Leaders broadcast their unit culture in a mix of idea sharing and healthy competition. Soldiers in each unit have ways to meaningfully contribute and be recognized for it.

Objective Goal: Culture is apparent in each unit and actively cultivated by both leaders and Soldiers. Our buildings celebrate our past and provide a vision of our future, rather than appearing relics of history.

Definitions:
2.3 Stick to our Game Plan. How closely units adhere to UTPs and mobilization plans.

2.4 Team Play Wins. Combined arms integration, across echelons, in both training and real operations. Includes WAARNG internal formations, and external formations such as other services, agencies, and allies and partners.

2.3 Stick to our Game Plan. Potential Ways: MSC campaign plans, with clear vision statements, that are nested under the State's campaign plan.

Objective Goal: UTPs have minimal changes between command teams. Units have a vision of their desired future state that they actively focus on achieving and that vision guides their decision making.

2.4 Team Play Wins. Potential Ways: Conduct UTM in collaboration with partners. Campaign plans establish conditions for team play by subordinate units as well as laying out higher headquarters crucible style events. LDPs support team play.

Objective Goal: UTM deliberately includes combined arms events and associated training progression that flex our METL muscles, leaving us postured to outperform peers in major events like XCTC and NTC rotations, and prevail in combat.

c. LOE 3: Innovation and Transformation.

“Organizations exist to make people's strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant. And this is the work of effective leaders.”

- Frances Hesselbein, Author of Hesselbein on Leadership

Definition: Innovation and transformation proactively emboldens change to enhance our readiness, relevance, and reputation for the current and future operational environment.

Definitions:

3.1 Management and Coordination. Leadership practices, including decision making, communication, and resource allocation, to achieve organizational goals.

3.2 Equip. Organizational and individual equipment as defined by Modular Table of Organizational Equipment (MTOE) and Common Table of Allowances (CTA). Also includes our facilities.

3.3 Assessment. The routine measurement and evaluation of knowledge, skills, capabilities, and performance through quantifiable and reliable data.

3.4 Experiment. ‘Fail early, adapt rapidly’ to actively test new ideas or approaches quickly, learn from failures as soon as possible, and then swiftly adjust course to improve the strategy or product. Essentially, embracing failure as a learning opportunity to quickly iterate and adapt to changing situations.

Why innovation and transformation matter:

Winning teams are agile and flexible. The profession of arms has never been more complex than it is today. Simple things are hard. Advances in technology, reduction in manpower, and increased requirements make our profession the most difficult in the world.

Change is hard and necessary. To adapt our systems to meet the needs of our partners, Soldiers, and Nation requires deliberate effort and internal reflection on how we do business. It requires sustained action toward gaining efficiencies and shifting towards data-driven, performance-based results balanced with experienced leadership. We ask this of our Soldiers; we must ask it of our staffs and processes.

We will innovate, adapt, and build decision spaces to exploit opportunity and establish streamlined **Soldier Centric** processes. We must posture ourselves to develop the agility to turn threats into opportunities.

LOE 3 End state: The WAARNG has an inherent culture of innovation. That culture, combined with self-awareness, empowers the ability to transform and gain efficiencies, leading to success in a dynamic and resource constrained environment.

3.1 Management and Coordination. Potential Ways: Clear communication of prioritization. Process improvement like Lean Six Sigma. Utilize

available systems to gain efficiencies, including robotic process automation and big data analytics. Focus on current, emerging, and potential operational environment (OE) and battlefield changes so we have relevance to win in modern large scale combat operations; fostered through internal dialogue and external engagement.

Objective Goal: The WAARNG balances leadership and management to generate internal efficiencies through clear prioritization, including cutting efforts that do not contribute to our strategy. Our formations continually adapt to OE and battlefield changes without having to be told to do so. The WAARNG is lean but healthy, and efficiency gains power transformation.

3.2 Equip. Potential Ways: Provide Soldiers with the equipment that most enables mission success, even if that equipment is commercial and not yet an official program of record. Align fieldings and equipment procurement to mission requirements and the Unit Readiness Cycle (URC). Outfit Soldiers and units to build uniformity and pride. Deliver weapons, combat vehicles, sustainment systems, and equipment that Soldiers need when they need it. Better manage our equipment through quality inventories so we can reduce losses that hold back our transformation. Promote activities that make our facilities great, like working groups to share best practices, awards for exceptional facilities, and dedicating work time for facility improvement.

Objective Goal: Soldiers and units have the best equipment for their missions, and our equipment losses are manageable and do not endanger other priorities. We have prioritized our facilities as investments in the future, not relics of our past. We maintain our facilities as places Soldiers want to serve, that build unit culture, promote individual and collective skills, and allow us to maximize home station training opportunities.

3.3 Assessment. Potential Ways: An easily understandable dashboard, with results displayed and reviewed at important functions like the Quarterly Readiness Review, and Commanding General Dialogue sessions. Surveys, with supporting analytics, to enable units to see themselves. Aggressively review existing policies to flatten bureaucracy, understand processes, and gain efficiencies utilizing process improvement models (Business Process Re-engineering, Lean Six Sigma, Baldrige Organizational Assessment, or new tools as they become available.)

Objective Goal: We have the right information to enable decision making and propel our strategy. Staff processes are self-reflective in nature through constant assessment and review. The most important metrics are accurate and highly visible and spur action, not excuses.

3.4 Experiment: Fail Early, Adapt Rapidly. Potential Ways: Help pilot initiatives, tactics, technologies, and operating concepts that are still in testing. Lean into newly adopted operating concepts and warfighting concepts, including Multi-Domain Operations and Continuous Transformation. Integrate with sister components/services. Be students of trends and opportunities within the total Army, foreign militaries, and private industry, as well as both current events and history. Reward innovation and experimentation. Embrace the use of Army Design Methodology as a way to unleash creativity.

Objective Goal: Experimentation is part of organizational culture, not forced, and is not dependent on having the right command team. We have partnerships to keep us relevant and ready for LSCO. We can point to real examples of both unit sponsored and individual examples experimentation.

d. LOE 4: Reputation.

“In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are: if you cannot create harmony - even vicious harmony - on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete.”

-General James Mattis, Author of Call Sign Chaos.

Definition: Reputation is the collective sentiment that the WAARNG’s Soldiers & employees, and external partners have for it. It is a measure of their trust and respect for the WAARNG’s actions and capabilities.

Why trust matters: Nobody wins alone; we need partners. The success of the Washington Army National Guard means the success of the State. As much as our society needs us in times of crisis, we need the Families, employers, and leaders of Washington State at all times. We need strong partners who understand our unique capabilities and our shortfalls who can advocate for us in society and in the family.

Partnership requires mutual trust. It must be nourished if it is to thrive. We must build trust with our Soldiers, our communities, and our external partners through our actions. Actions that are not aligned with our words break trust. When partners ask hard things of us, we build trust by winning and consistently producing positive results. We become trusted partners when we succeed in meeting their needs. In turn, they help us meet ours. We must also trust ourselves by behaving in a manner worthy of trust, and in accordance with our **Organizational Values**.

Definitions:

4.1 Build Internal Trust. Soldiers, family, and employers receive and understand and our communication and know that we act in good faith.

4.2 Communicate to Stakeholders. Communicate, down & in, and up & out with clear and consistent themes and messages.

4.3 Solidify External Partnerships. Community, state, NGB, and international partnerships remain steadfast through leadership turnovers on either side, and local/national/geopolitics.

LOE 4 End state: The WAARNG’s reputation builds trust between Soldiers, family, community, state & national partners. The WAARNG fosters credibility, understanding, support, and reliance as the preferred partner for future opportunities.

4.1 Communication. Potential Ways: Communicate up and down through echelon via a comprehensive system of information distribution utilizing traditional and emergent media in order to reach target audiences.

Objective Goal: Improve communication methodologies and systems to enable rapid and accurate

shared understanding.

4.2 External Engagement. Potential Ways: Positively influence external actors to become stakeholders that support WAARNG priorities and objectives. Increase engagement with NGB. Increase engagement with local media through the PAO to positively shape perception of the WAARNG. Interface with local leadership in our communities including employers, chambers of commerce, military and civic oriented organizations (E.g., WDVA, WSMTRC, VFW, NGAW, NGAUS, Civil Air Patrol, JROTC, SF Association, Order of St. George/St. Barbara) and recognize their support.

Objective Goal: WAARNG Leaders and Soldiers actively and routinely engage with external actors at echelon to create new stakeholders for the WAARNG.

4.3 Internal Engagement. Potential Ways: Develop strong commitment to and from our Soldiers, full-time employees, Families, and communities enabling life-long commitment to WAARNG service. Include family programs in planning processes to utilize Soldier and Family advocacy program resources effectively to understand, resource, and address concerns from our internal stakeholders and maximize diversity. Use sensing sessions, town halls, and social media engagement to identify trends. Communicate intent at echelon via regular and timely correspondence. Generate feedback loops with internal stakeholders to facilitate dialogue.

Objective Goal: WAARNG actively and routinely engages with internal stakeholders to reinforce trust and build commitment.

6. Proponency.

The proponent for this action is the Office of Strategic Plans, G5. Any changes, recommendations or revisions to this product are sent to the G5 distribution list at ng.wa.waarng.list.g5@mail.mil.

Carter W. Richardson
Carter W. Richardson
Command Sergeant Major
Washington ARNG
RAINIER 7

Paul T. Sellars
Paul T. Sellars
Brigadier General
Commanding
RAINIER 6

Appendix 1. Glossary.

Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence. The Baldrige Criteria employs a systems perspective to align goals across organizations, focusing on core values. The core values are leadership, strategic planning, customer focus, measurement analysis and knowledge management, workforce focus, operations focus, and results. (AR 5-1)

Constraint. A restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action a subordinate commander. (FM 5-0)

Global Campaign Plan. Primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities. Also called GCP. (JP 5-0)

Global Force Management. Processes that align force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of strategic guidance. Also called GFM. (JP 3-35)

Integrated Management System. The IMS captures the totality of Army decision-making and creates assessment mechanisms employing the SMS. The IMS enables Army leadership to make resource-informed decisions that provide our Nation with a trained and ready force at best value. The IMS assigns responsibility and focuses effort, provides direction and a means to monitor execution of the Army Strategic Plan, ensures synchronization of resources, and defines progress as a basis for resource allocation.

Lean Six Sigma. LSS is a disciplined, data-driven approach and methodology for eliminating defects (driving toward six standard deviations between the mean and the nearest specification limit) in any process. The Army's LSS program maintains a cadre of continuous improvement practitioners who can sustain the Army's ability to execute enterprise-level and local LSS projects. (AR 5-1)

Limitation. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. See also constraint; restraint. (JP 5-0)

Line of Effort. In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. Also called LOE. (JP 5-0)

Line of Operation. A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 5-0)

Metric. Indicators that measure progress compared to an established standard and can be analyzed to assess progress towards achieving desired outcomes (AR 5-1)

National Military Strategy. A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives. Also called NMS. (JP 1-0)

National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. (JP 1-0)

Operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

Operational Approach. A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

Operational Art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

Operational Design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation plan or order. See also campaign; major operation. (JP 5-0)

Operational Environment. The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

Readiness. The ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. See also national military strategy. (JP 1-0)

Risk Assessment. The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). Also called RA. (JP 3-07.2)

Risk Management. The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 3-0)

Strategic Direction. The strategy and intent of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in pursuit of national interests. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Estimate. The broad range of strategic factors that influence the commander's understanding of the operational environment and the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. See also estimate. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Guidance. The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. See also intelligence; operational intelligence; tactical intelligence. (JP 2-01.2)

Strategic Level of War. The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. See also operational level of warfare; tactical level of warfare. (JP 3-0)

Strategic Mobility. The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 4-01)

Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0). Business (Civilian) Strategy is the conscious choice to be clear about an organization's direction in relation to what is happening in the dynamic environment and to better position for proactively responding to a changing environment; drives internal cultural change. (Strategic Planning for Dummies).

Theater Strategy. An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. See also national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy. (JP 3-0)

System. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)

Appendix 2. References.

Policy and Doctrinal Sources

National Security Strategy, October 2022. The President of the United States.

National Defense Strategy, 2022. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Books

Hesselbien, Frances. *Hesselbein on Leadership*. Joh Wiley, and Sons Inc., 2013.

Kahneman, Daniel. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011.

Mattis Jim. *Call Sign Chaos*. New York, NY: Penguin Random House LLC, 2019.

Sinek, Simon. *Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action*. London, UK: Penguin Publishing, 2009.